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Muddied Waters:  
A Review of Joint Venture Jurisprudence in 
Missouri 
Colin W. Byrd* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly four decades ago, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an 
opinion that continues to generate confusion on what constitutes a joint 
venture.  Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. not only distorted the 
elements required to establish a joint venture but also provided for the 
business organization’s wrongful creation by operation of law through 
implication.1  Upon this shaky foundation, corporate law jurisprudence in 
Missouri has grappled for decades with the same essential questions of what 
constitutes a joint venture and how this species of partnership may come into 
existence. 
Within the past decade alone, Missouri courts have entertained several 
suits brought by plaintiffs relying on the flawed law espoused in Johnson.2  
Not only does this expose corporate entities to recurring litigation over the 
same or similar issues, but it also provides for uncertainty at the crucial 
intersection of law and business in which these entities pursue their economic 
 
 * Colin Westin Byrd: B.A., University of Arkansas, 2018; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law 
Review, 2019-2020.  I am eternally grateful to Professor Thom Lambert for his insight, 
guidance, and support in writing this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its 
help in the editing process.  I would also like to thank my late father, Christopher W. 
Byrd, whose example made this Note possible. 
 1. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. 1983) 
(en banc). 
 2. See e.g., Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F.Supp. 3d 1084, 1093–1096 
(E.D. Mo. 2019).; Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 
2501138 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017); Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-
CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013); Appellant’s Reply 
Brief, Marathon Reprographics, Inc., et al., v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 584 S.W.3d 822 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (No. WD82392), 2019 WL 2718911, at *8, *12. 
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aspirations.  It is time for the Supreme Court of Missouri to disavow the faulty 
reasoning and bad law for which Johnson stands. 
This Note discusses the development of joint venture law within 
Missouri jurisprudence.  Part II of this Note considers the facts and holding of 
Johnson3 within the context of the legal background in which it was decided.  
Part III then highlights the trend found in lower courts of ignoring the holding 
of Johnson in light of the recent developments in joint venture jurisprudence.  
Part IV discusses how the Johnson holding was wrong at the time it was 
decided, and how its flawed reasoning has allowed for confusion and 
conflicting case law for Missouri courts and litigants.  This Note concludes 
by illustrating the need for the Supreme Court of Missouri to address the 
confusion perpetuated by Johnson and provide the clarification necessary for 
entrepreneurs and corporations to conduct business in reliance on firmly 
established law once again. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Missouri, it is generally agreed upon that a joint venture is an 
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise 
for profit.4  Essentially, a joint venture is a species of partnership that lasts for 
a specific duration of time or until the completion of a particular project or 
goal.5  Therefore, a joint venture satisfies the traditional elements of a 
partnership business organization.6 
In analyzing the formation of a joint venture, “there must be a 
community of interest in the accomplishment of a common purpose, a mutual 
 
 3. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 238. 
 4. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14–15 (Mo. 1970) ((quoting 
State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland, 197 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)); 46 AM. 
JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2020); Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 
(Mo. 1973)). 
 5. See Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14–15 (Mo. 1970); see 
also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW   COMM’N 1997).  UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt. b (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (citing Jonathan 
Woodner Co. v. Laufer, 531 A.2d 280, 285 n.7 (D.C. 1987)) (An arrangement labeled 
a ‘joint venture’ is a partnership if the arrangement meets the criteria stated in 
Subsection (a). In fact, in many jurisdictions, the law of general partnerships applies 
almost without analysis to joint ventures in which the co-venturers share profits.”). 
 6. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or 
not the persons intend to form a partnership. 
(b) An association formed under a statute other than this [act], a predecessor statute, 
or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership under this [act]. 
Id. 
2
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right of control, a right to share in the profits and a duty to share in the losses 
as may be sustained.”7  Thus, the three elements that constitute a joint venture 
are: (1) multiple persons; (2) sharing managerial control or the right of 
managerial control; and (3) sharing in the profits and losses of the 
organization.8  
These three elements, or a variety of the same, were primarily introduced 
by Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell,9 and continue to be referenced as 
indications of the existence of a joint venture.10  Furthermore, Jeff-Cole 
highlighted the fact that Missouri courts were hesitant to imply the existence 
of joint ventures where a different arrangement was expressly created.11  This 
is especially the case where a joint venture is alleged when a business 
organization is in operation for a period of years.12  This was the legal 
background at the time Johnson was decided.13 
Johnson presented the issue of whether or not two corporate entities 
created a joint venture by implication where a freight broker contracted a 
shipping entity to transport a load of steel across the country.14  During the 
transport, the tractor trailer struck and killed a motorist.15  The establishment 
of a joint venture between the two entities would enable the plaintiff to hold 
 
 7. Howard, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973) (citing Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d 
724, 730–31 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15–16. 
 10. See e.g., Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 11. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 16  (“The existence of a different type of 
express contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint [v]enture 
by implication.”).  This hesitation on behalf of Missouri courts continues to be the 
trend today.  See Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 
2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (“Where an express written 
contract between the parties establishes a specific business form, Missouri courts have 
been reluctant to imply the existence of a joint venture.”); Marathon Reprographics, 
Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616-CV29350, at*3, n.3 (Cir. Court of 
Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018) (“The Barfield Court first acknowledged Missouri 
Courts were moving away from implying joint venture agreements when corporate 
entities were involved.”). 
 12. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (citing Morrison v. Caspersen, 323 
S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1959)). A defining characteristic of a joint venture is its specified 
duration of time, rather than indefinite – i.e., a partnership. 
 13. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 239–45 nn.1–21 
(Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 14. Id. at 238. 
 15. Id. 
3
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the broker vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver in causing the 
accident.16 
Thomas Johnson was killed on November 19, 1978, in an automobile 
collision with a tractor trailer unit, leased by Tabor, and driven by Brown.17  
Johnson’s widow, Cathy, obtained a judgment against Pacific Intermountain 
Express Company (“P.I.E.”) and Marlo Transport Corporation (“Marlo”) for 
$750,000.18  The defendants appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Southern District, which subsequently affirmed the judgment.19  The case was 
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which heard the case as an 
original appeal.20 
Tabor owned and leased two tractors which operated with eighteen-
wheel trailer units.21  Brown and Singleton were employed as drivers of the 
tractor trailers.22  None of the three men possessed a common carrier license 
for the transportation of freight from the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”) or any state authority.23  Their operation consisted of picking up a 
load of produce on the West Coast and then hauling it to the East Coast.24  
After the eastbound produce was delivered, the drivers would look for a 
westbound load, which usually involved the leasing of the equipment to a 
common carrier possessing ICC authority.25  
The load for the fatal trip was arranged by Marlo in its capacity as a 
freight broker.26  Marlo did not operate trucks for shipping purposes, nor did 
it possess any ICC authority.27  Marlo arranged for a load of steel to be hauled 
from Franklin Stainless Corporation in New York to Broken Arrow, 
Oklahoma by Brown in the 1978 Kenworth.28  The tractor trailer unit, in 
addition to operating without the required ICC authority, carried a load that 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 239. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. A state issued common carrier license, or certificate, permits the licensee 
to transport goods and passengers through intrastate commerce by way of the state’s 
public highways. See e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 390.051 (2012). 
 24. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 239 n.3 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 
303(b)(6) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(6)(B) Supp. V 1981)) (providing an exemption 
from operating authority for the shipment of agricultural commodities in interstate 
commerce). 
 25. Id. at 239.  Leases of this kind are permitted under certain conditions by ICC 
regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1978) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (2018)). 
 26. Johnson,662 S.W.2d at 240. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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was over the weight limit for several states on the route.29  Consequently, the 
drivers selected a route designed specifically to avoid weigh stations.30  There 
was no evidence Marlo knew of the overload, selected the desired route, or 
knew of the effort to avoid possible involvements with “the law.”31 
Prior to embarking on the journey, Marlo paid an advance to the 
drivers.32  Marlo was to collect the freight charges from the shipper, or 
consignee, and retain a twenty-five percent fee for its brokerage services.33  
The remainder of the shipping fee was to be remitted to Tabor for the drivers’ 
services and use of the 1978 Kenworth.34  However, the freight was never 
delivered.35 
P.I.E.’s involvement in the case at hand is not significant to the focus of 
this Note; however, a brief discussion of P.I.E.’s role is necessary for a more 
complete understanding of Johnson’s holding.  P.I.E. was a major interstate 
carrier of freight at the time of the accident in 1978.36  Singleton and Tabor 
testified to several dealings with P.I.E. prior to the accident, in which they 
transported cargo under the aforementioned equipment-lease regulatory 
scheme.37  While P.I.E. disclaimed any knowledge of any lease or dealings 
with Brown, Tabor, or Singleton, a P.I.E. sign was still affixed to the 
Kenworth at the time of the accident from a previous shipment.38 
Nonetheless, the court, while admitting the evidence was “sketchy,” 
stated that the jury, in finding P.I.E. liable for negligence, could have found: 
(1) the 1978 Kenworth made its last westbound trip under P.I.E.’s operating 
authority ten or twelve days before the accident; (2) it carried signs previously 
furnished by P.I.E.; (3) P.I.E. made no effort to collect the signs at the end of 
the run; and (4) at least one sign was on the tractor at the time of accident.39  
Despite the court’s hypothetical jury findings, there was no evidence that the 
fatal trip was made under P.I.E.’s authority or with its knowledge, or that 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. There was no discussion as to the nature of this advance in the opinion. 
More specifically, whether this advance was for the drivers’ expenses along the route 
(similar to the advance provided by P.I.E.), or if the advance was a portion or the 
whole of the payment to the drivers for their services, was never determined. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1978) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 
(2018)). 
 38. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 240. Singleton testified that there had been 
discussion that the P.I.E. sign might also be helpful in avoiding law enforcement along 
the route due to the overload. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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P.I.E. had any interest in the revenues of the shipment.40  Therefore, the 
plaintiff’s claim against P.I.E. depended upon a constructive agency theory 
derived from the federal statutes and ICC regulations.41 
The dispute in Johnson centered on the jury instructions for both Marlo 
and P.I.E. concerning their vicarious liability.42  The liability of P.I.E. was 
affirmed based upon “statutory policy rather than a conventional respondeat 
superior [principal-agent] theory.”43  However, this Note is only concerned 
with the liability imposed upon Marlo by the court’s characterization of the 
arrangement between Marlo and Tabor-Singleton as a joint venture.  
Marlo’s vicarious liability was put forth in “Jury Instruction Number 8:” 
Lee Brown, Jr., was operating the Kenworth Truck within the scope 
and course of his agency for Marlo Transportation Corporation at the 
time of the collision, and 
Acts were within the “scope and course of agency” as that phrase is 
used in this instruction if: 
There were performed by Lee Brown, Jr. to serve the interests of Marlo 
Transportation Corporation according to an express or implied 
agreement with Marlo Transportation Corporation, and 
Marlo Transportation Corporation either controlled or had the right to 
control the physical conduct of Lee Brown, Jr.44 
Marlo argued that under the arrangement it had no control, or right of 
control, over Brown as he headed west in the tractor trailer.45  Instead, Marlo 
asserted that it properly retained the proprietor of the tractor trailer, as an 
independent contractor, to achieve a particular result but not the method by 
which the delivery was accomplished.46  Therefore, Marlo argued there was 
no basis for its vicarious liability.47 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 239. 
 43. Id. at 245. 
 44. Id. at 241. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (A.M. LAW INST. 1958). 
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something 
for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control 
with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or 
may not be an agent. 
Id. 
 47. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241. 
6
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The court first considered the “practicalities of the situation rather than 
the legalities.”48  By this reference, the court highlighted the facts used to find 
that an implied joint venture existed between the two entities.49  In the typical 
practice of a freight broker, Marlo was in touch with a customer who needed 
to transport a load of steel.50  Marlo then fulfilled this need by entering into 
an arrangement with Brown and Singleton, as lessees of Tabor’s tractor trailer, 
to transport the shipment to Oklahoma.51  Marlo and the truckers did not 
memorialize their agreement in writing but “rather operated informally.”52  
Marlo was tasked with collecting payment from the customer and retained 
twenty-five percent for its brokerage services under the agreement.53  The 
court’s final “practicality” was that neither party expressed concern about the 
lack of operating authority in accordance with ICC regulations.54 
Upon returning to the “legalities,” the court concluded that the 
arrangement formed by the entities was a joint venture because “the parties 
undertook a particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.”55  Without much 
analysis, the court hastily concluded, not only that the arrangement 
sufficiently satisfied the requisite elements of a joint venture, but also that an 
implied joint venture existed between the two corporations.56  Therefore, the 
majority affirmed the judgment against Marlo based upon the existence of an 
implied joint venture between the corporate defendants.57   
Even at the time Johnson was decided, the Supreme Court was divided 
over several aspects of the case, including the majority’s finding of a joint 
venture between Marlo and Tabor.58  While each of the dissenting judges 
disagreed with holding P.I.E. liable, only Judge Welliver dissented in 
 
 48. Id.  In referring to the practicalities, the court is referring to the conduct of 
the parties within the arrangement. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 242. 
 58. Id. at 246–48. Chief Judge Rendlen and Judges Gunn and Billings concurred 
with Judge Blackmar’s opinion for the majority. Judge Higgins concurred in the 
portion of the opinion affirming the judgment against Marlo, but dissented in the 
affirmance of plaintiffs’ judgment against P.I.E. Judge Donnelly dissented from the 
majority’s affirmance against both defendants writing “Today, the [c]ourt ignores 
settled Missouri law and implants, again without rationale, a scheme for redistribution 
of property.” Id. at 246 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Welliver dissented 
from the majority in its affirmance of the judgment against both P.I.E. and Marlo. 
7
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affirming the judgment against Marlo.59  His dissent was two-fold, arguing 
that the court erred in finding that Marlo and the defendants “undertook a 
particular project, for mutual benefit and profit,” and that there was a basis to 
conclude that Marlo had an “equal right of control.”60 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The elements that constitute a joint venture are generally agreed upon.  
Naturally, there may be some discrepancies in the wording of particular 
elements but substantively, the same requirements must be met: (1) multiple 
persons (2) who combine their skills and resources, (3) share in managerial 
control over the enterprise, and, as a result, (4) share in the profits and losses 
of said enterprise.  
Joint venture litigation typically concerns two main issues: (1) the 
threshold or degree to which the elements of a joint venture are satisfied based 
upon the facts and circumstances of any given dispute; and (2) the definition 
of terms within these elements.  In other words, issues have often centered on 
whether both parties possessed sufficient managerial control, or whether the 
distribution method between the parties actually constitutes profit sharing.  
Either way, both issues must be satisfied and present for an agreement to 
constitute a joint venture by law.61 
Like partnerships, joint ventures may be express or implied.62  A “joint 
venture may be established without any specific formal language to enter into 
a joint enterprise; it may be implied or proven by facts and circumstances 
showing such enterprise was entered into.”63  However, joint ventures differ 
from partnerships in the deference given to the parties’ arrangement if another 
 
 59. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 246–48 (Mo. 
1983) (en banc). 
 60. Id. at 248 (Welliver, J., dissenting). 
 61. Eads v. Kinstler Agency, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); 
Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1970). 
 62. Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); see Jeff-
Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15; Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-
04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (quoting Scott v. 
Kempland, 264 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Mo. 1954)) (“A joint venture may also be ‘implied 
and inferred, in whole, or in part, from the acts and conduct of the parties and from 
proven facts and circumstances showing that such enterprise was in fact entered 
into.’”). 
 63. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15 (citing State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland, 
197 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)). 
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business organization is created by the express terms of the agreement.64  This 
is in part because the parties must intend to form a joint venture.65 
A. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Systems 
In Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Systems, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, considered whether a joint venture existed 
between two corporations.66  In that case, Mary Jo Ritter, on behalf of a former 
patient’s estate, sued the Barnes Jewish Christian Hospital and its parent 
corporation for negligent medical care resulting in the patient’s death.67  
Building upon the framework set forth in Jeff-Cole68 and Rosenfeld,69  the 
Ritter court recognized that the existence of an express contract forming a 
different business organization is “in itself inconsistent with a claimed 
relationship of a joint venture by implication.”70  Therefore, courts will not 
imply the existence of a joint venture where evidence indicates that a different 
business organization was created by the parties.71  Moreover, joint ventures 
between two corporations must be contractually agreed upon.72  Joint ventures 
between corporations are rarely implied, especially when there is an express 
agreement to the contrary. 
 
 64. “Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1995) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself 
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by implication.”); Binkley 
v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 166, 170–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to imply a joint 
venture or partnership where the evidence demonstrated only the existence of a 
contract for services, which contained “clear disclaimers” of a joint venture or 
partnership relationship). 
 65. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (emphasis added). 
 66. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 67. Id. at 381. 
 68. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (“The existence of a different type of express 
contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by 
implication.”). 
 69. Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]t is 
inappropriate for a court to imply a joint venture where, as here, it is evident that there 
is a different business form involved.”). 
 70. Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 15 (citing State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland, 197 
S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)) (“[T]here need be no express agreement to 
share losses, for if the status is established, such an agreement may be implied; and 
also, that a corporation may, by contract, become a part of a joint venture.”). 
9
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B. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative 
In Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri dealt with the notion of an 
implied joint venture between two corporations.73  In that case, a putative class 
action was brought against Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative and KAMO 
Electric Cooperative, among others.74  The class, representing about 3,000 
landowners, sued the defendants for misusing electric transmission line 
easements.75  The suit alleged that the two cooperatives formed a joint venture 
by distributing telecommunications services via the same fiber-optic cable 
networks and soliciting customers from the same website.76 
In considering the plaintiffs’ allegations, the court recognized that 
Missouri courts have been hesitant to imply the existence of a joint venture 
between corporations.77  In arguing that Missouri courts have found the 
existence of an implied joint venture between corporations, the plaintiffs cited 
Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky.78  Hobart held a jury may infer that two 
corporations formed a joint venture where one corporation agreed to advance 
money to the other and take charge of its clerical work, the corporations shared 
equally in the profits, and eventually formed a single corporation.79  However, 
in differentiating Hobart from the dispute at hand, the Barfield court pointed 
out that the corporations had “an express agreement to act in ways that 
mapped on to the elements of a joint venture, such as the right to share profits 
and control.”80 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs relied on Johnson in arguing that the right to 
share profits was not a necessary element in the formation of a joint venture.81  
Again, however, the court struck down the plaintiffs’ argument.82  The court 
cited Judge Welliver’s dissent in Johnson, and noted that his characterization 
of the arrangement formed between the corporate defendants as instructive to 
 
 73. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 
12145822 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013). 
 74. Id. at *1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *2. 
 77. Id. at *3; see Morrison v. Caspersen, 323 S.W.2d 697, 701–02 (Mo. 1959); 
In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1027 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(“Corporations may become members of joint ventures only by express agreement or 
contract.”); Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 78. Barfield, 2013 WL 12145822, at *3 (citing Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky, 
46 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1931)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at *4. 
 82. Id. 
10
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the case at hand.83  “[T]he majority’s interpretation of the relationship as a 
joint venture was not in line with precedent, as the broker earned a fee upon 
hiring a driver for his clients, and had no further participation in or control 
over the transaction after that point.”84 The Barfield court supported its 
conclusion, and Welliver’s dissent, by also citing more recent Missouri cases 
holding that the right to share in profits is a necessary element of a joint 
venture.85  
Ultimately, the Barfield court held that the plaintiffs failed to produce 
sufficient evidence of an express agreement between the defendants to form a 
joint venture.86  The court concluded that this deficiency in the plaintiffs’ 
evidence was fatal to their assertion that a joint venture was ever formed 
between the defendant corporations.87  
Even more recently than Barfield, Missouri courts at several levels have 
continued to entertain claims which have relied on Johnson for the proposition 
that corporate entities may impliedly form joint ventures through their 
“actions” rather than their intentions.88  This is despite the weight given to the 
parties’ intent to form a joint venture in joint-venture analyses.89  Moreover, 
the facts relied on by the Johnson court in finding an implied joint venture set 
a relatively low bar, and rather inaccurate standard, for the satisfaction of the 
elements of joint ventures.90 
C. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc. 
In Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri heard a dispute arising out of a rear-end collision 
between a semi-truck and a motorcycle on Interstate Highway 55 in New 
 
 83. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 247–
48 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 84. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 247–
48 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 85. Id.;see Jones v. St. Charles Cnty., 181 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); 
Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 
joint ventures “require[] that the parties have a right to share in the profits and a duty 
to share in the losses.”). 
 86. Barfield, 2013 WL 12145822, at *6. 
 87. Id. (“At most, the record indicates that Sho-Me and KAMO had a close and 
cooperative business relationship.”). 
 88. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983) (en 
banc). 
 89. See Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1970). 
 90. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241–42 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (finding that defendant 
corporations impliedly formed a joint venture where one party received a fixed 25% 
brokerage fee and had no managerial control after its initial arrangement of the 
shipment). 
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Madrid County, Missouri.91  The plaintiff alleged that the semi-truck driver 
was employed by A.K. Logistics at the time of the accident, and also that the 
driver was carrying a shipment for the third-party defendant, C.H. Robinson.92  
The plaintiff sought to hold C.H. Robinson liable on several theories, 
including joint liability consequential to its status as a joint venturer with A.K. 
Logistics.93  The facts and issues of the dispute were very similar to the ones 
adjudicated in Johnson.94 
The Riley court noted a significant difference between the formation of 
agency relationships and the formation of joint ventures.95  In analyzing the 
formation of agency relationships, the parties’ intent to form such a 
relationship is only one of many factors to be considered.  However, “the 
parties’ intent to form a joint venture is given significant, if not controlling, 
weight in a joint-venture analysis.”96 
The defendants argued they were not engaged in a joint venture because 
they: (1) did not intend to form a joint venture; (2) did not share a common 
pecuniary interest; and (3) did not have equal control or the right to equal 
control in managing the enterprise.97  Their denial of a common pecuniary 
interest was based on the payment structure of the defendants’ contractual 
agreement which was similar to the one between Marlo and Tabor, Singleton, 
and Brown in Johnson.98  While the defendants admitted that they each 
certainly had a shared economic interest in the enterprise, their chosen 
payment structure – a fixed per-delivery fee – did not equate to profit 
sharing.99  Additionally, their contractual agreement stated that A.K. Logistics 
was an independent contractor and expressly disclaimed the formation of a 
joint venture.100 
Again, the plaintiff here relied heavily on Johnson in urging the court to 
find the characterization of the defendants’ relationship was not controlling.101  
To support his argument, the plaintiff contended that the terms of the express 
 
 91. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 2501138, 
at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; Johnson, 662 S.W.2d 237. 
 95. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *8. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 
16 (Mo. 1970)) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself 
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint [v]enture by implication.”); see 
Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 97. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *9. 
 98. Id.; see Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241–42. 
 99. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *9 (A.K. Logistics received a fixed per-delivery 
fee for each successful delivery.). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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agreement supported a finding of a joint venture because both parties shared 
control over the shipment.102  In essence, because of this “shared control over 
the load,” the court, like the Johnson court, should have “implied that a joint 
venture existed between the broker and carrier because the entities had 
undertaken ‘a particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.’”103 
Despite the plaintiff’s reliance on Johnson, the court found that while 
A.K. Logistics and C.H. Robinson did share an economic interest, the two 
entities did not share profits or control over the enterprise.104  The court 
pointed to the fact that A.K. Logistics was not involved in, and had no control 
over, the price C.H. Robinson negotiated with its customers.105  In other 
words, the benefit to A.K. Logistics was derived from separate, third-party 
agreements between C.H. Robinson and its clients.106  Because A.K. Logistics 
had no control over the agreements C.H. Robinson entered into, the enterprise 
lacked both profit-sharing and mutual control between the defendant 
corporations.107  Therefore, the court held as a matter of law that A.K. 
Logistics and C.H. Robinson were not engaged in a joint venture.108 
A.K. Logistics lack of control over the agreements parallels Tabor’s lack 
of control over the agreements entered into by Marlo.  As a freight broker, 
Marlo sought out shippers to deliver its clients’ cargo.109  Just like C.H. 
Robinson, Marlo had an interest in finding a contractor who could transport 
the cargo for a reasonably affordable rate so that each entity involved in the 
enterprise stood to gain a profit.110  
D. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al. 
More recently, the Jackson County Circuit Court adjudicated a joint 
enterprise dispute concerning similar issues.111  In that case, the plaintiff, 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241–42 
(Mo. 1983) (en banc)). 
 104. Id. at 11. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.; see Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 
388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Merely sharing an economic interest is not sufficient to 
form a joint venture. There must be some evidence of the parties participating and 
having control over the enterprise.”); see also Tuggles v. Thompson, 183 S.W.3d 611, 
617 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2006) (all parties having joint and several control over the 
enterprise is an indication of joint venture). 
 108. Id. at 10. 
 109. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Mo. 1983). 
 110. Riley, No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR. at 241. 
 111. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616-
CV29350 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018). 
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Marathon Reprographics, Inc. (“Marathon”), brought suit against J.E. Dunn 
Construction Company (“JE Dunn”) and Site 10.01, Inc. (“Site 10.01”) for 
several claims arising out of an alleged joint venture concerning the 
development of project management software.112  JE Dunn filed a summary 
judgment motion arguing that it and Marathon were not engaged in a joint 
venture as a matter of law.113 
Marathon argued that all four of the elements from Ritter114 need not be 
met in order to establish a joint venture.115  Marathon cited Manley v. 
Horton116 for this proposition.117  However, the court refuted Marathon’s 
contention by clarifying that the Manley court “was referring to the 
evidentiary elements in the case and not to the legally required joint venture 
elements.”118  Therefore, the “great weight of case law” requires a plaintiff to 
establish all four elements.119  The court declared that Barfield120 was 
instructive in the court’s analysis and its holding that “the right to share in 
profits is a necessary element of a joint venture.”121  Moreover, because 
Missouri courts hold parties must have equal control over the enterprise, a 
failure to show joint control is “dispositive of whether a joint venture 
exists.”122 
In a footnote, the court also highlighted the fact that where an express 
written agreement between the parties establishes a specific business 
organization, Missouri courts are again hesitant to find the existence of a joint 
venture.123  However, similar to Johnson,124 there was no formal written 
 
 112. Id. at *1. 
 113. Id. at *2. 
 114. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1999). See supra Section II for Missouri Joint Venture Elements. 
 115. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3. 
 116. Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Mo. 1967) (“The stated elements 
are matters to be considered in [the determination of a joint venture], but they are not 
conclusive, jointly or severally.”). 
 117. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3. 
 118. Id. at *3. 
 119. Id. ((citing Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 
377, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)); Eads v. Kinstler Agency, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 289, 292 
(Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996); Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973). 
 120. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 
12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013). 
 121. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3 (quoting Barfield v. Sho-Me Power 
Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 
2013)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 4 n.4. 
 124. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241–42 (Mo. 1983) 
(en banc). 
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agreement between the entities, yet Marathon insisted there was evidence of 
an express, oral agreement between the entities to form a joint venture.125  
Specifically, Marathon contended: (1) JE Dunn would use Marathon’s 
software on agreed-upon construction projects in exchange for preferential 
pricing; (2) Marathon and JE Dunn would jointly market their IT-collaborated 
construction services and use their combined capabilities for their shared 
financial benefit; and (3) both entities would have an equal voice in the control 
and direction of the partnership.126  To support the establishment of this oral 
agreement to form a joint venture, Marathon presented evidence that the 
parties had previously discussed creating a joint venture.127  
However, the court could find no evidence that the entities intended to 
share in profits and losses.128  This finding was partially based on Marathon’s 
acknowledgment of testimony, which confirmed the absence of profit-
sharing.129  Additionally, the court also found no evidence that Marathon had 
an “equal voice” in the enterprise because JE Dunn had the sole authority to 
decide on which projects to use Marathon’s software.130  Finally, the parties 
each conceded that they maintained control over their own employees and 
systems.131  Therefore, because Marathon failed to demonstrate that the two 
entities shared in profits and losses and also possessed joint and several 
control over the project, Marathon’s contention that the parties formed a joint 
venture failed as a matter of law.132 
Despite the holding in Marathon, confusion remains as to what may 
constitute a joint venture in Missouri.  Ambiguity as to whether joint ventures 
between corporations may be implied further exacerbates this confusion 
despite recent cases to the contrary.133  Marathon could just have easily cited 
Johnson, instead of Manley, for the proposition that joint ventures between 
corporations may be implied, just as the plaintiff did in Riley.134  In the same 
vein, Marathon could have also cited Johnson for the proposition that profit-
sharing is not an essential element in establishing a joint venture like the 
plaintiff in Barfield.135  The Marathon court likely would have struck down 
 
 125. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *4. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 6; see Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 
377, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 133. See e.g., Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 
2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013). 
 134. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 2501138, 
at *9 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017). 
 135. Barfield, No. 11-CV-04321-NKL at *4. 
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these arguments citing the decisions in the respective cases, and profit-sharing 
has generally been accepted as a necessary element in a finding of a joint 
venture.  Regardless, the same issues continue to be litigated and disputed in 
Missouri courts.  
E. Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co. 
There is a case, Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., currently before the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri concerning 
whether a joint venture was established between defendant corporations in the 
development and marketing of certain seeds and herbicides.136  In that case, 
Bader Farms, Inc. and Bill Bader are suing Monsanto Co. and BASF 
Corporation for the destruction of the plaintiffs’ peach orchard based on 
activities arising out of the defendants’ alleged joint venture.137  Despite an 
express contractual agreement forming an independent contractor 
relationship, which also explicitly disclaimed the establishment of a joint 
venture between the corporate defendants, the court has overruled the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion disclaiming joint venture.138  In the 
same case, an additional issue has been raised regarding whether a duty to 
share in the losses of the enterprise is a necessary element in establishing a 
joint venture.139  The court held “[t]he requirement of ‘shared losses’ is not a 
strict one under Missouri law.”140  Relying on these two issues, the court 
overruled defendants’ summary judgment motion “despite the defendants’ 
stated intention not to form a ‘partnership.’”141 
The Barfield court was one of the first to expressly acknowledge that 
Missouri courts were moving away from implying joint venture agreements 
when corporate entities were involved.142  This trend is further compounded 
by courts’ hesitation to imply joint ventures when another business 
organization is expressly created.143  Nonetheless, the same arguments 
continue to manifest conflicting outcomes. 
 
 136. Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, at *11 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 31, 2019). 
 137. Id. at *1. 
 138. Id. at 16–17. 
 139. Id. at 16. 
 140. Id. (citing Morley v. Square, 2016 WL 1615676, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 
2016); compare Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding joint ventures “require[] that the parties have a right to share in the 
profits and a duty to share in the losses.”). 
 141. Bader Farms,MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, at *16.. 
 142. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616-
CV29350, at *3, n3 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018). 
 143. See e.g., Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. 
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A joint venture remains essentially “an association of two or more 
persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.”144  However, 
recent cases have refined the elements that constitute a joint venture.  A joint 
venture is established when the following criteria are met: “(1) an express or 
implied agreement among members of the association; (2) a common purpose 
to be carried out by the members; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in 
that purpose; and, (4) each member has an equal voice or an equal right in 
determining the direction of the enterprise.”145  The parties must intend to 
create a joint venture which may be evidenced by actively participating and 
sharing in profits, all parties having joint and several control, and having a 
duty to share in losses.146  Furthermore, Missouri courts are hesitant to imply 
joint ventures between defendant corporations.  The hesitation is exacerbated 
when there is an express agreement between the defendant corporations 
evidencing the creation of a different business organization or arrangement. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Subpart A of this Part discusses the inconsistencies and error in 
Johnson’s holding and also the practical significance of its undesired effect.  
Next, Subpart B analyzes the importance of distinguishing a joint venture 
from a traditional arms-length arrangement and is discussed by focusing on 
the legal ramifications of each relationship.  Finally, building off of these 
relevant distinctions, Subpart C examines the corporate law of Delaware,147 
culminating in a solution to help clarify joint venture jurisprudence in 
Missouri. 
A. Johnson’s Flawed Analysis 
The holding in Johnson was incorrect in imposing joint liability upon 
Marlo based on a finding of joint venture between it and the truckers.  While 
 
Ct. App. 1995) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself 
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by implication.”); Jeff-Cole 
Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970) (“The existence of a different type 
of express contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint 
[v]enture by implication.”). 
 144. Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.(citing Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970)). 
 147. Delaware is considered to be the leading jurisdiction and benchmark in state 
corporate law. More than sixty-seven percent of all Fortune 500 companies are 
incorporated in Delaware. DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, ANNUAL 
REPORT STATISTICS (April 24, 2020) https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ 
[https://perma.cc/5FH4-95L5]. 
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the Johnson court’s decision to hold P.I.E. liable was a stretch,148 the legacy 
of the court’s joint venture analysis, or lack thereof, has inflicted the most 
damage by perpetuating confusion surrounding the elements establishing joint 
venture in Missouri.  Since the decision, Johnson’s faulty reasoning has 
continued to find its way into the briefs and arguments of plaintiffs seeking to 
hold corporate defendants liable for damages based on findings of joint 
ventures. 
The Johnson court’s joint venture analysis was flawed for three 
reasons.149  It incorrectly held: (1) Marlo’s twenty-five percent brokerage fee 
constituted a share in the profits of the enterprise; (2) Marlo exercised 
sufficient managerial control over the operation of the enterprise; and (3) the 
enterprise constituted an implied joint venture despite the lack of an express 
contractual agreement establishing one.150  
First, the court did not give any reasons for finding that Marlo’s twenty-
five percent brokerage fee satisfied the requisite element of profit sharing.151  
The court even enumerated the profit-sharing requirement, yet failed to 
sufficiently explain how the element was satisfied.152  Consequently, the 
omission opened Johnson’s holding to the interpretation that profit sharing is 
not an essential element in establishing a joint venture.153 
Second, the court glazed over the facts in finding that Marlo had 
exercised sufficient managerial control, or possessed the right of control, over 
the enterprise equal to that of Brown, Singleton, and Tabor.154  Later on, the 
court contradicted this finding in admitting that “Marlo . . . could not exercise 
effective control while the truck was on the highway but, as is usual in joint 
ventures, the participants had their assigned roles in the total project.”155  
Accordingly, the court reasoned, “No showing of right of control over and 
above that which follows as of course from a showing of joint venture need 
be made.”156 
 
 148. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 245 (Mo. banc 
1983) (“The conclusion we reach is based on statutory policy rather than a 
conventional respondeat superior theory.”). 
 149. See id at 241–42. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 
WL 12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (where plaintiffs relied on Johnson 
for the proposition that the right to share in profits, and subsequently the duty to share 
on losses, were not necessary elements in forming a joint venture). 
 154. Johnson 662 S.W.2d at 241–42. 
 155. Id. at 242. 
 156. Id. 
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The court used Marlo’s actions as a freight broker, prior to the physical 
shipment of the steel, as evidence of its managerial control.157  Because Marlo 
was “instrumental in launching and directing the truck journey,” coupled with 
the fact that Marlo did not obtain a regular, certified carrier for the shipment 
of steel, the court believed Marlo played a sufficient role in the death of 
Johnson.158  Therefore, Marlo must be found culpable based upon a theory of 
implied joint venture.  This non sequitur approach by the court, i.e., culpable 
therefore liable, is further exemplified by the court’s focus on refuting Marlo’s 
assertion of an independent contractor-employer relationship, rather than 
satisfying the elements of a joint venture.159  
The court noted that Missouri courts have been hesitant to uphold claims 
of immunity based upon independent contractor status.160  The court tried to 
couch the establishment of a joint venture, and Marlo’s vicarious liability, in 
a “tendency to find that truck operators are agents or servants rather than 
independent contractors.”161  This tendency referenced by the court was 
exemplified in Madsen v. Lawrence.162  However, the issue in Madsen 
concerned whether a dump truck driver was considered an employee or an 
independent contractor when he negligently allowed his dump truck to roll 
down a hill and strike the minor child.163  The Johnson court conflated the test 
in Madsen – master-servant versus independent contractor – with an analysis 
for whether a joint venture existed.164  
As the only dissent in affirming the judgment against Marlo, Welliver 
rightly focused on Marlo’s status as a freight broker and its role in the shipping 
industry.165  While recognizing that Marlo had an economic interest in the 
delivery of the freight, Welliver pointed out that Marlo had no further legal 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. “Marlo’s case is not helped by the fact that it did not try to place the load 
with a regular, certified carrier, having regular routes and published tariffs, but rather 
did business with itinerant truckers with no semblance of operating authority.” Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.; see e.g., Madsen v. Lawrence, 366 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo. 1963). 
 161. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 242 ((citing Madsen v. Lawrence, 366 S.W.2d 413, 
415 (Mo. 1963)) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new 
trial where evidence introduced justified a finding that a driver of a dump truck was a 
servant rather than an independent contractor)). 
 162. Madsen, 366 S.W.2d at 418–19. 
 163. Id. at 415. 
 164. See id. Id. (citing Barnes v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, 108 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 
1937)) (“A servant is a person employed by a master to perform service in his affairs 
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or subject to 
the right of control by the master.”); Cf. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241. 
 165. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 247 (Welliver, J., dissenting).  A freight broker 
places shippers in contact with clients who need products shipped to various locations 
throughout the country. 
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interest at stake with respect to the fee once Brown agreed to haul the 
freight.166  Therefore, because Marlo’s participation in the transaction ended 
at this point, the court erred when it found that “[t]he parties undertook a 
particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.”167 
In finding no basis for the majority’s characterization of the payment 
system as a profit-sharing arrangement, Welliver also argued there was no 
basis for finding that Marlo had “equal right of control” in the arrangement.168  
He pointed to the fact that Marlo could not have controlled the operation of 
the truck, even by the exercise of reasonable care.169  Therefore, given the 
autonomy with which the driver acted in choosing the desired route, Welliver 
was convinced that the driver acted more like an independent contractor.170 
The Johnson court seemed inclined to hold Marlo liable for policy 
reasons, rather than based upon satisfying the elements which constitute a 
joint venture.171  As previously discussed,172 the effects of this inclination 
have repeatedly appeared in litigation by plaintiffs relying on Johnson’s 
holding to establish an implied joint venture between two corporations on 
rather loose evidentiary grounds. 
B. Practical Implications of Johnson’s Flawed Analysis 
Traditionally, parties to a contract agree on the obligations and expected 
performance prior to the execution of the contract.  These obligations are 
imposed by contractual duty, rather than by law.  Very few non-waivable, 
contractual duties are imposed by law.173  By leaving these obligations to be 
decided by the parties, the law encourages negotiation at the outset of the 
contractual agreement.  However, as the nature of the relationship changes, 
the degree to which the law imposes standards of conduct changes as well.  
Joint venture is considered a species of partnership, differing only in the 
enterprise’s specified duration.174  As such, joint ventures are subject to the 
 
 166. Id. at 248. 
 167. Id. (quoting Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241). 
 168. Id. (quoting Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 242 (majority opinion) (“This is not a situation in which Marlo 
should be allowed to escape liability by asserting independent contractor status.”); Id. 
at 248 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (“The result reached by the majority cannot be viewed 
as other than basing liability for damages on the depth of the defendant’s pocket 
without regard to the degree of the defendant’s fault.”). 
 172. See supra section III. 
 173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”). 
 174. Stram v. Miller, 663 S.W.2d 269, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
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rules and fiduciary obligations governing partnerships.175  Among these 
fiduciary obligations are a duty of care and a duty of loyalty in the conduct of 
business transactions furthering the enterprise.176  The imposition of these 
fiduciary obligations stems from the unique relationship participants share 
with one another in a joint venture.  The elements of joint venture allude to 
this point.  As joint venturers, each has control over the other’s resources and 
a joint interest in the profits of the enterprise.177  Therefore, it makes sense for 
the law to impose heightened standards of conduct on a relationship where 
one is trusted with the financial assets of another.178  In addition to these 
fiduciary duties, each participant is jointly and severally liable for both the 
debts and obligations of the enterprise and for any tortious conduct committed 
in furtherance of the enterprise.179 
The distinction between these two types of relationships has significant 
practical implications.  By asserting the existence of a joint venture, a plaintiff 
is seeking to impose duties and obligations upon the parties that do not exist 
in an arms-length contractual relationship.180  Thus, by altering the legal status 
of an agreement, a plaintiff may significantly alter the legal consequences and, 
subsequently, the legal remedies available to her.181 
 
 175. Denny v. Guyton, 40 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Mo. 1931) (en banc) (“[R]ights as 
between the adventurers are governed by the same rules that govern partnerships.”); 
J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959) (“The relationship of 
joint adventurers is fiduciary in character and imposes upon all of the participants the 
utmost good faith, fairness and honesty in dealing with each other with respect to the 
enterprise.”); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1997) (“A partner owes to the partnership and the other partners the duties of loyalty 
and care stated in subsections (b) and (c).”) (stating partners owe the partnership and 
other partners fiduciary duty of loyalty). 
 176. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Joint adventurers, 
like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the 
finest loyalty. . . A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior.”). 
 177. Unif. P’Ship Act § 409(a), (h) (amended 2013) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1997). 
 178. Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Mo. 
2005) (en banc) (“A fiduciary relationship is established when one reposes trust and 
confidence in another in the handling of certain business affairs.”). 
 179. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) 
(“Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), all partners are liable jointly 
and severally for all debts, obligations, and other liabilities of the partnership unless 
otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Birdsong v. Bydalek, 953 S.W.2d 103, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(explaining that fiduciary duty to another party arose out of joint venture). 
 181. See Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 
1983) (en banc). 
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In practice, the establishment of a joint venture, and its corresponding 
obligations, provides two primary avenues through which plaintiffs may seek 
compensation from corporate defendants.  The first is through utilization of 
joint and several liability imposed upon the entities by law.182  Through this 
avenue, third parties with deeper pockets may be held liable for injuries 
sustained by plaintiffs as a result of activities conducted in furtherance of the 
joint venture.183  This avenue is illustrated in Johnson184 and A.K. Logistics.185  
The second avenue is opened by the heightened fiduciary duties that 
participants owe to one another while engaged in a joint venture.186  Instead 
of simply owing a duty of good faith and fair dealing in an arms-length 
transaction, joint venturers owe to one another fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty in furtherance of the joint venture.187  For example, in a case where a 
traditional, arms-length agreement has fallen through, a wronged party may 
allege that the agreement actually constituted a joint venture, and therefore 
impose fiduciary duties upon the other that had not previously existed.  This 
avenue was pursued in Marathon.188 
Despite this, lower courts have begun to ignore the low standard set in 
Johnson for the establishment of a joint venture between defendant 
corporations, in favor of the precedent acknowledged in Barfield.189  Even in 
the face of this trend, the continued existence of Johnson in Missouri’s 
corporate law jurisprudence gives plaintiffs’ lawyers an argument to proffer 
in litigation. 
In citing Johnson, a plaintiff’s lawyer need simply argue a shared 
economic interest in an enterprise between two corporate entities in order to 
raise the question of whether the contractual agreement may in fact be a joint 
venture.190  Even if the allegation of joint venture is a frivolous one, the 
 
 182. UNIF. P’SHIP Act § 306 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (“Except 
as otherwise provided . . . all partners are liable jointly and severally for all debts, 
obligations, and other liabilities of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the 
claimant or provided by law. 
 183. See, e.g., Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 238. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 
2501138 at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017). 
 186. See Unif. P’Ship Act § 409 (amended 2013) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1997). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., No. 1616-
CV29350 at *1 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018). 
 189. Id. at *3 n.3. 
 190. See Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 
1983) (en banc). 
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question of its existence may be enough to survive a summary judgment 
motion and allow costly litigation to continue.191  
C. Moving Forward from Johnson 
Moving forward, it is pivotal to understand the difference between 
sharing in the revenue of an enterprise and sharing in the profits of one in 
order to avoid altering the legal status of enterprises.  In this context, revenue 
refers to all incoming cash flow generated from an enterprise, whereas profit 
refers to incoming cash – i.e., revenue – less expenses.  Sharing in the profits 
of an enterprise imposes a duty on the parties to also share in the losses of the 
same, should there be any.192  “Losses,” in this context, may include liability 
for any debt obligations incurred by either partner over the duration of the 
joint venture, or liability for tortious conduct committed by either partner.  
Conversely, sharing in revenue simply imposes a contractual duty to share in 
the expected revenue of an enterprise.  There is no duty to share in the losses 
or satisfy the financial liabilities of the joint venture.193  The existence of either 
method of distribution will certainly evidence the existence of a shared 
economic interest in an enterprise.  However, the ability to distinguish one 
form of distribution from the other will clarify the legal status of the 
enterprise, and subsequently the duties and liabilities owed by the parties 
participating in the enterprise. 
This better understanding may be realized through clarification of the 
requisite elements of joint venture.  From this foundation, courts may be better 
equipped to distinguish the difference between arrangements that qualify for 
the categorization of joint venture and those that do not; the significance being 
the duties the law imposes upon the respective relationships. 
Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence has recognized the significance 
of this duty to share in the losses as a requisite element in establishing joint 
venture.194  The Delaware Supreme Court laid out a general description of 
 
 191. See e.g., Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1093–1096 
(E.D. Mo. 2019). 
 192. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409(a) (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) 
(“Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership distributions and . . . is 
chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in proportion to the partner’s share 
of the distributions.”). 
 193. See Meredith Dev. Co. v. Bennett, 444 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) 
(“It is a general rule that . . . partners and joint venturers impliedly agree to share losses 
in the same proportion as profits.”); Binkley v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (distinguishing revenues and profits). 
 194. Warren v. Goldinger Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d 507 (Del. 1980); N.S.N. Int’l 
Indus., N.V. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. C.A. 12902, 1994 WL 148271, 
at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 1994) (holding that a joint venture, and therefore a fiduciary 
relationship, had not been formed where there was no agreement to share in the losses 
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joint ventures, similar to the set laid out in Jeff-Cole.195  However, unlike 
Missouri, the Delaware Supreme Court has since opted for further 
specification of its requisite elements in 1980,196 and in doing so moved away 
from a “broad definition of ‘joint venture.’”197  In Delaware today, a joint 
venture may be established by the following elements: (1) a community of 
interest in the performance of a common purpose; (2) joint control or right of 
control; (3) a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter; (4) a right to share 
in the profits; and (5) a duty to share in the losses which may be sustained.198 
Likewise, several decades ago. the Supreme Court of Missouri set forth 
a generalized description of elements that established joint venture.199  Years 
later, however, this description of elements was relegated to indicia of the 
existence of a joint venture.200  Rather than solidifying their necessity in the 
creation of a joint venture, the Supreme Court of Missouri labeled them as 
instructive characteristics in a joint venture analysis.201  While this was 
insightful, and certainly intended to be helpful in an analysis, the court’s 
instructive, rather than binding, list of elements has had the opposite effect on 
the development of Missouri’s corporate law jurisprudence.202 
 
of the enterprise); Wah Chang Smelting & Ref. Co. of Am. v. Cleveland Tungsten 
Inc., No. Civ. A. 1324-K, 1996 WL 487941, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1996). 
 195. J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959); cf. Jeff-Cole 
Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970). 
 196. Warren, 414 A.2d at 509 (quoting Kilgore Seed Co. v. Lewin, 141 So.2d 809, 
810–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)). 
 197. Wah Chang, 1996 WL 487941 at *4. (“Twenty-five years after recognizing 
a broad definition of ‘joint venture’ in J. Leo Johnson, the Supreme Court explained, 
in modified language, the elements of a “joint venture” in 
Warren v. Goldfinger Brothers, Inc.. . .”). 
 198. Sunrise Ventures, LLC v. Rehoboth Canal Ventures, LLC, No. 4119-
VCS, 2010 WL 975581, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2010) (quoting Warren v. Goldinger 
Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1980)). 
 199. As a general rule, in order to constitute a joint adventure, there must be a 
community of interest in the accomplishment of a common purpose, a mutual right of 
control, a right to share in the profits and a duty to share in the losses as may be 
sustained.” Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973) (citing Bell v. 
Green, 423 S.W.2d 724, 730–731 (Mo. 1968)). 
 200. “Indications of a joint venture include: actively participating and sharing in 
the profits, all parties having joint and several control, and having a duty to share in 
losses.” Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d 15, 16)). 
 201. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 15. 
 202. “[I]t appears clear that the ‘shared losses’ factor is not a strict requirement in 
Missouri.” Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 2019) 
(citing Morley v. Square, Nos. 4:14-CV-172, 4:10-CV-2243 (Consolidated), 2016 WL 
1615676, *at 8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2016)). 
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To remedy this issue, the Supreme Court of Missouri should recognize 
that the following elements constitute a joint venture: (1) a community of 
interest in the performance of a common purpose; (2) joint managerial control 
or right of control; (3) share in the profits of the enterprise; and (4) a duty to 
share in the losses of the same, should there be any.  Not only does this list 
correspond to those that the court has previously recognized for joint venture, 
but the elements fully recognize the characteristics of this particular business 
organization and warrant the heightened legal status that goes with it. 
Delaware recognized the importance of detailing the elements that 
establish joint venture decades ago.203  Moreover, several jurisdictions have 
also followed suit in requiring the duty to share losses as an element in 
establishing joint venture.204  As a result, Delaware and many other 
jurisdictions have avoided, for the most part, the confusion experienced 
because of Johnson.  It is time for Missouri to do the same. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Joint ventures are unique entities derived from partnerships and, as a 
consequence, the laws which govern them have developed out of partnership 
law and through the common law.  This development has given rise to the 
discrepancies in not only the elements required to form such entities but also 
to what degree these elements need be satisfied.  This effect is innate to the 
nature of the common law system.  However, when disputes over the same 
 
 203. Wah Chang Smelting & Ref. Co. of Am. v. Cleveland Tungsten Inc., No. 
Civ. A. 1324-K, 1996 WL 487941, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1996). “Although the 
definition in J. Leo Johnson states that a joint venture involves a ‘single business 
enterprise,’ often joint ventures are highly intricate relationships that consist of ‘more 
than just one business transaction’ and often involve the acquisition and operation of 
a complex entity.” Id. 
 204. See, e.g., J.R. Simplot Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. CV 06-141-S-EJL, 2009 
WL 564194, *at 8 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that the duty to share in losses is 
a required element for joint venture) (citing Warren v. Goldinger Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d 
507, 509 (Del. 1980)); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 535 (Tex. 2002) 
(“[A] joint venture exists “if the persons or entities concerned have . . . (3) an 
agreement to share losses. . .”); Radaker v. Scott, 855 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Nev. 1993) 
(“A joint venture is a contractual relationship in the nature of an informal partnership 
wherein two or more persons conduct some business enterprise, agreeing to share 
jointly, or in proportion to capital contributed, in profits and losses.”); Fetter v. Schink, 
902 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In order to establish a joint venture under 
New York law, . . . (5) there must be a provision for the sharing of both profits and 
losses.”); Censor v. ASC Techs. of Connecticut, LLC, 900 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (D. 
Conn. 2012) (“To constitute a joint venture, courts in Connecticut prescribe a five part 
test that requires that . . . (5) there must be a provision for sharing of both profits and 
losses.”). 
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issues continue to be relitigated due to ambiguity in the law, action must be 
taken to lift the fog. 
Joint ventures formed as a result of the economic interests of the persons 
and entities that entered into them.  Contrary to this notion, joint ventures are 
often used as mechanism for holding those persons or entities liable in tort.  
Certainly, one who negligently harms another should be held liable in 
remedying that injury.  However, when corporations expressly disclaim the 
formation of such organizations and then cannot subsequently rely on those 
express provisions within the four corners of their agreements, waste occurs. 
Clarification of the law establishing and governing joint ventures is 
needed to remedy this uncertainty.  In turn, this clarification will decrease the 
waste by reducing transaction costs associated with the litigation arising from 
the ambiguity, thereby promoting efficiency.  Corporate entities will no longer 
have to guess what the law is, nor will they be forced to relitigate elements 
which have been firmly cemented in legal or statutory precedent.  The effect 
being corporate entities transacting and participating in commerce in greater 
volume because of their increased reliance on the legal ramifications of the 
business organizations they choose as a means to their economic ends.  It is 
time for the Supreme Court of Missouri to provide this clarification. 
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